Mark Wright, Amin Singh, Tanner Jones
ROSEN USA, Houston, USA
Abstract
Achieving zero incidents has been a key safety objective across the pipeline industry. The relationship between the pipeline industry and pipeline regulations has seen several iterations since the first regulations were introduced in 1968. Significant changes and rigorous regulations enacted in 2002 required pipeline operators to create a structured framework for risk and integrity management programs. However, subsequent safety performance has been static, as detailed in the preamble to more recent updates in 2019. Pipeline regulations serve as minimum requirements for achieving operational safety by reducing incidents, and there should be hope of a more substantial impact with the effects of rule changes to both gas and hazardous liquid pipeline regulations in 2019.
Failures of pipelines are often complex, involving primary, secondary and even tertiary contributory factors, while rulemaking must be discrete and realistically achievable for compliance. Thus, failures and rulemaking are not completely associative, but neither are they mutually exclusive. The preamble to the 2019 rules identified clear lineages between a subset of significant events and rulemaking i.e. measures that directly address some of the causes of significant events. Whilst this seems intuitively sensible, where do these solutions lie in the spectrum between causality and mutual exclusivity on a wider scale?
All pipeline failures are undesirable, but each provides an opportunity to learn and highlights systemic vulnerabilities by identifying areas for improvement. This paper explores reported failure data for both gas and liquid transmission pipelines in the U. S. between 2003 and 2022. The paper will identify trends and thus residual gaps in understanding of failures within the industry for proactive measures to prevent future incidents. The complexity of failure will be explored by review of supplementary NTSB investigation reports and commentary on the combination of factors at play. The primary goal of integrity management is to operate assets such as pipelines safely. Inherent is that integrity management cannot be about doing everything possible, rather maximizing everything practicable. This paper hopes to identify what practicable may look like now and in the future.



